The Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the first "global" and largest carbon offset instrument, supplementing national or regional cap and trade systems such as the European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This paper draws on weekly IDEACarbon survey data from 2008 to 2010 to empirically examine how investor's perception of the CDM regulatory and administrative framework affects the price of CERs in secondary markets (denoted as sCER) and the price spread with EUAs. Results from cointegration analysis and GARCH modeling indicate that the perception of investors about the relative stringency and efficiency of this framework is a significant determinant of the sCER price and the EUA-sCER price spread. An increase in perceived stringency causes significant increases in sCER prices and a substantial narrowing of the EUA/sCER price spread (and vise versa). The analysis also shows that the EU ETS market was instable over the period examined, with a structural shift occurring at the end of 2008 likely due to the 2008 financial crisis. JEL Classification: Q56, Q68,
Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under the Kyoto Protocol has two primary objectives: to promote clean development in non-Annex I countries, typically developing countries; and to assist Annex I (developed) countries in achieving their Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reduction commitments through cost-effective clean production investments in non-Annex I countries (IPCC, 2007) . Certified Emission Reduction units (CERs) generated from CDM projects can be used by Annex I countries to help comply with their emission reduction targets, supplementing thereby their Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) certified by a Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee. By 2012, the end of the Kyoto commitment period, the CDM is expected to account for about 1.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e) in emission reductions in non-Annex I countries (World Bank, 2010) .
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest source of demand for CERs; other sources of demand include Japan, Canada and private entities under regional cap and trade regimes in the United States. While there is a linking mechanism between the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol, European Union Allowance (EUA) units under the EU ETS are only partially substitutable by CERs due to caps limiting the degree of substitutability (Flam, 2009) .
1 Although both Certified Emission Reduction (CER) units issued under the CDM and European Union Allowance (EUA) units issued under the EU ETS represent the right to emit one ton of CO 2 in the atmosphere, CERs trade at a discount to EUAs in secondary markets (denoted as sCERs). The partial fungibility between CERs and EUAs and other regulatory uncertainties, including the future role of CERs in the EU ETS and delays related to transferring CERs into national climate registries, are contributing factors for the discount.
More recently, the recession and the Eurozone crisis, combined with lack of consensus of the worlds' major economies to continue the Kyoto protocol, have been driving down the demand for EURs and sCERs. This has led to the decline of the trading price of sCERs from highs around $20 before the financial crisis to less than $1 in October 2012. In response, the European Commission presented proposals to regulate the phase III supply of EUAs to be auctioned, in order to support the carbon price and restore operators' confidence. In the case of sCERs, the situation is further complicated by use restrictions on credits from HFC-23 and N2O projects 2 . The future role of the CDM in carbon trading is uncertain in light of the virtual collapse of CER market prices.
Yet, there is much to be learned from the 10-year history of the CDM, which attracted billons of euros of private capital on an annual basis. Apart from channeling funds to developing world for clean development, the CDM is the largest offset instrument, complete with functioning frameworks and standards for the issuance and trading of credits for GHG reduction. In the event that governments decide to strengthen their collection action to reduce GHG emissions, lessons learned from the CDM experience will be useful in reforming the CDM and developing other market instruments.
Emissions trading schemes (ETS) appear to be a preferred market-based instrument for mitigating global climate change, with many countries or jurisdictions implementing or planning to implement ETSs 3 . Within the ETSs, offsets will likely continue to play an important role in reducing mitigation costs and promoting lowcarbon technologies in the developing world. The Australian Emission Trading Scheme will be introduced in July 2015, which allows the use of CERs and will be linked to the EU ETS. China, the world's largest emitter of GHG, has committed to reduce carbon delivery risks in the primary CER market, where project developers negotiate over-thecounter forward agreements to sell CERs before they are issued.
Many factors influence the success of a CDM project and the CER price in the primary market; some are macro-level risks common to all CDM projects, others are project and country specific. Factors related to the political and administrative processes that govern the issuance of CERs are common to all CDM projects, such as registration and verification risks. The premiums that investors put on these risks can be used as proxies for their perception about the stringency of the regulatory and administrative processes leading up to the issuance of CERs. The higher the risk premium the higher the perceived stringency of the regulatory and administrative processes -resulting in longer wait times and/or higher rates of rejection. Regression analysis of the survey and price data shows that premiums placed on registration, verification, and issuance risks are positively correlated with the price levels of sCER, and negatively correlated with the EUA-CER price spread.
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first empirical analysis of the supply factors of CERs as determinants of the sCER price and the EUA-sCER spread. It is also the first study pointing to a connection between the EUA-sCER price spread and investors' perceived project delivery risks in the primary CER market. Building on the analysis by Mansanet-Bataller et al (2010) in examining the price determinants of EUAs and CERs, our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the analysis of the sCER price dynamics and the EUA/CER price spread. The next section of the paper, Section 2, provides a broad overview of international carbon trading, while the following sub-sections outline the particulars of price formation in the primary and secondary markets for CDM project-based credits. Section 3 outlines the data and econometric specifications for the paper while Sections 4 and 5 present the detailed results of our empirical study. The paper concludes with policy implications and recommendations.
An Overview of International Carbon Markets

EUA and sCER Spot Price Dynamics
CDM projects generate CER credits through a variety of emissions reduction methodologies. Each unit of CERs represents 1 ton of CO 2 emissions (or GHG equivalent) and are traded in EU ETS together with EUAs. At present, the national CER import quotas are fixed at rates varying from 3% to 50% of total emissions, while the aggregate limit or overall "import cap" on the use of project credits in the EU ETS stands at roughly 13.5% of total compliance requirements (Gregoriou and Healy, 2009 provide the first empirical analysis of sCER price levels and EUA/sCER price spread dynamics. Specifically, they find that EUA and sCER movements share many of the same determinants, including oil, coal, and gas prices, news events surrounding the linking mechanism, as well as a momentum indicator that tracks sCER prices lagged five days.
For the dynamics of the EUA-sCER spread, they identify as significant determinants a number of market microstructure variables, including proxies of EUA and CER trading activity.
CDM Projects and the Primary CER Market
Unlike the EUAs allocated directly to installations under the National Allocation
Plans of the EU member countries, behind every sCER there is a unique provenance with an implicit background story. CER credits are generated by projects located in nonAnnex 1 developing countries, financed and owned by a wide variety of entities, and using alternative methodologies to achieve varying magnitudes and forms of emission reductions across different time frames. All projects undergo a formal review and approval process in order to be credited for their emission reductions. CER purchasing agreements are negotiated between buyer and seller at various stages of the project review/approval process. These purchasing agreements are non-standard -each associated with an individual set of terms that distribute risk between buyer and seller, which are highly relevant to their price. Though the agreements are generally nonstandard, it is possible to categorize the most typical deal types (Nordseth, et al 2007) . Contrary to sCERs, primary CER forward contracts often embed a degree of uncertainty and default risk, which varies at different stages of the project activity cycle.
Settlement of contracts is not guaranteed, and projects can fail any number of review criteria set forth by the CDM Executive Board. This makes forward agreements useful tools for project developers looking to hedge future credit generation and secondary price risks by trading an uncertain and risky stream of future payments for certain (but heavily discounted) compensation in advance of CER issuance.
It is likely that an examination of primary CER prices will reveal key insights about the formation of carbon market expectations and risks. In a 2010 analysis of risk premia in CO 2 allowance markets, Chevallier (2010) notes how expectations and risk preferences of carbon market participants determine futures prices on CO 2 allowances.
In particular, he describes how a market participant looking to buy a futures contract will form an expectation about the future spot price of the underlying contract and add a risk premium that compensates him for bearing the risk of unfavorable movements in the spot price. This "expectations approach" is preferable in the carbon markets in the absence of statistical evidence for a cost-of-carry relationship that would justify a theory of storage approach to futures pricing (Chevallier, 2010) . In the context of this theoretical framework, we propose a stylized model for pricing a primary CER forward agreement:
Here, CER t denotes the primary CER price at time t, T-t is the wait-time-toissuance, r is the discount rate, and π t is the risk premium at time t. Both the expectation of the time-T sCER price and the probability of project success are conditional upon the information available to the buyer at time t. In particular, this time-t conditioning information set Ω t encodes data about the project's current stage of development. As a project moves further along the project activity cycle, the wait-timeto-issuance should decline while the probability of project success should increase, ceteris paribus. This is because, as a project nears the issuance stage, it must pass fewer review hurdles (where the CDM Executive Board can potentially delay a project, or even reject it).
While sCERs are free of the kind of risks that are typically associated with primary market CERs, prices of sCERS are affected by the same factors that influence project success and wait-time-to-issuance. The regulatory framework that causes changes in wait-time-to-issuance and project success also changes future supply of sCERs, causing the prices of EUAs and sCERs to change as well. As a result, movements in primary CER price spreads elucidate vital information about expected sCERs supply in the future and should have an impact on sCER prices. As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, the wait-time-to-issuance is a dynamic feature of the primary CER market that has fluctuated wildly even before the start of the 2008-2012 Kyoto Protocol implementation period. Therefore, it is clear that primary-market spread dynamics belong in a model aiming to trace the evolution of the sCER prices and the EUA-sCER spread. (i) saving a penalty payment which is weighted by the probability that penalties arise, and (ii) receiving an additional payment equal to present value of leftover permits at the end of the last trading period.
In the case of sCERs, if a regulatory framework experiences a change that slows down the process that CERs are issued, it will cause less sCERs to be issued by the end of the trading period. The effect of tighter future supply of emission credits is equivalent to reduction of future permits available to cover emissions. This leads to higher current spot permit prices including both sCERs and EUAs, and vice versa. In addition, the change in the regulatory framework also will also affect the price spread between EUAs and sCERs, which is in part due to the EU ETS import cap of 13.4%. Lowering future supply of sCERs reduces the probability of sCER supply exceeding the import cap set by the EU and improves the fungibility of sCERs. This will lead to narrowing of the EUAsCER price spread, and vice versa.
The relationships between a change of the regulatory framework and sCER prices and the EUA-sCER spread will be tested in the following section using IDEAcarbon survey data and European Climate Exchange trading data. The econometric specifications based on the above theoretical arguments are also presented in the next section.
Data
1 CER Primary Market Survey Data
The variables for primary CER forward price spreads are constructed using the According to Point Carbon's database of actual transactions, there has been a clear tendency towards an increased price differentiation between categories, indicating an increased understanding of the risk premiums associated with these transaction categories (Nordseth, et al, 2007) . This dataset offers a rare glimpse into the opaque world of primary CER pricing, where contracts are negotiated over-the-counter between project developers and other carbon market participants. Although broad categorizations of the most typical deal types can be identified based on the risk distribution between buyer and seller, actual contracts in the primary CER market are typically non-standardized and prices vary within each category according to a particular project's underlying performance risk and a set of terms and conditions associated with the transaction (Nordseth, et al, 2007) .
The IDEACarbon survey abstracts from project-specific or country-specific risk factors and can be interpreted as the average price that respondents are willing to pay (per CER) for primary CER forward contracts from average projects at different stages of the project activity cycle. The survey respondents' willingness to pay for bearing various types of risks are determined by their perceptions about the opportunity cost of capital related to probability of project success, wait-time-to-issuance and expected future sCER prices. The stringency of the CDM Executive Board's review standards and their efficiency in processing the applications would have a direct impact on the wait-time-toissuance and the probability of project success. In addition, the CDM Executive Board affects future sCER prices through a general equilibrium effect. Therefore, the survey respondents' willingness to pay acts as a proxy for the stringency and efficiency of the regulatory framework with regards to the various stages of the review process. We construct the primary-market CER forward contract price spreads as follows: 
EUA and sCER Prices and Their Determinants
The spot sCER price (sCER t ) is obtained from the published Reuters sCER Price Index. Since sCER are forward contracts, the EUA prices are the rolled-over nearestmaturity EUA futures contract (EUA t ) listed on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) over the same period. For both sCER and EUA prices, weekly averages are calculated based on daily prices for the same period as when Ideacarbon conducted weekly surveys of the primary CER market. The EUA-sCER price spread (hereafter Spread t ) is constructed through subtracting the spot sCER price (sCER t ) from the rolled-over nearest-maturity EUA futures contract over the same period.
EUA and sCER prices fluctuate widely and are influenced by macro and micro level determinants in the short and long-run. A number of macro drivers affect the supply and demand for permits, including overall GHG quota allocation in Kyoto Annex B countries, voluntary GHG mitigation, and the supply of CDM and other projects that generate carbon credits. In the short-run, EUA and sCER price drivers include institutional events causing supply and demand shocks, fuel prices (notably the coal-gas price differential), European weather and factors affecting speculative activities.
For energy prices, we use average weekly Brent (BRENT) and natural gas futures prices (GASPOOL), coal CIF ARA 9 (ARA_COAL) and the baseload electricity price in Germany (GER_BASELOAD). Also used are indicators of market trends, including the market volatility index (VIX_CLOSE) and the change in the yield spread between short and long bonds (ΔYIELD_SPREAD). To capture arbitrage opportunities to take advantage of the EUA-sCER price spread, we also use EUA trading volume and CER trading volume as potential liquidity proxies (since different liquidity risk profiles might contribute to the price spread between the EUA and the CER). Intuitively, these contracts should be more liquid on higher trading days than on lower trading days.
In terms of EUA allocation issues, intra-phase supply of EUAs is fixed by the National Allocation Plans (NAP), although announcements on the relative strictness of raises questions about the stability of the carbon market and possibility of structural breaks in the data, which will be examined in the empirical analysis.
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[ Figure 4] 
Cointegration Analysis
Although EUAs and sCERs are not the same asset, they share many common price drivers. In fact, EUAs are often times used as a bench mark for negotiating prices (Table 2 ).
[ Table 2 ]
Next we fitted a VAR model relating first differences in sCER prices (∆sCER t ) and that of EUA prices (∆EUA t ) in order to model the data-generating process for each variable (Table 3) . Within the VAR framework, a likelihood ratio test confirms the optimality of a 6-period lag selection. Based on the above modeling results, we isolate the innovations in ∆sCER t not explained by ∆EUA t and its own lagged values. Hereafter dEUAt refers to the residuals of ∆EUA t in the VAR(6) model relating ∆EUA t and ∆sCER t , and similarly dCERt refers to the residuals of ∆sCER t in the VAR(6) model. As expected, ∆sCER t and ∆EUA t are confirmed to be stationary processes.
[ Table 3 ]
Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Results
Following Mansanet et al (2010), we employed the GARCH to examine the price drivers of sCERs and the EUA-sCER price spread 10 . First, we use the residuals of the VAR(6) model for sCER (dsCER t ) as dependent variables and the residuals for EUA, and the first differences of primary CER price spreads of a set of supply and demand factors as independent variables to analyze the price drivers of sCERs. Second, we use the first differences of the EUA-sCER price spread as the dependent variable and the same set of independent variables as above. The empirical model specification for the VAR (6) We include variables relevant to energy prices and financial market trends. For energy prices, we include average weekly Brent (BRENT) and natural gas futures prices (GASPOOL), coal CIF ARA 11 (ARA_COAL) and the baseload electricity price in Germany (GER_BASELOAD). Also included is the market volatility index (VIX_CLOSE), and ΔYIELD_SPREAD the change in the yield spread between short and long bonds. Dummy variables are also included, indicating major events relevant to the supply and demand of EUA and CERs.
The estimation results for the change in the VAR(6) residuals, dsCER, using a GARCH are shown in Table 4 . The results reveal a strong relationship between the change in the residuals for sCER and EUA. This testifies to the common sources of innovation between the two series. They also indicate a strong relationship with the change in the registration price spread from the survey and the issuance spread.
Interestingly, none of the other price and financial market variables capturing supply and demand influences are significant. It is possible that the EUA residual has already captured the supply and demand influences.
[ Table 4] A simpler ordinary least squares equation is also estimated for the change in the spread, ΔSpread and presented as Table 5 . This equation reveals a strong relationship with the change in the price of European Union Allocations --ΔEUA. It also shows a strong link with the change in the registration, verification, and issuance price premiums. ΔVIX_CLOSE, the change in the market volatility index, is also significant at 10% level. This indicates that the EUA-sCER spread is at least partially affected by factors related to arbitrage opportunities.
[ shift, we carried out a Chow test for coefficient stability for the basis specification in Table 5 . This test shown in Table 6 confirmed our suspicions that the relationship is not stable. It indicates that the hypothesis that there is no breakpoint at the end of 2008 can be rejected at least at the 5 per cent level of significance using an F test and at a higher level of significance using the log likelihood ratio or the Wald Statistic.
[ Table 6 Tables 7 and 8 . Each part passes a Chow test for stability if its sample is again divided in two. These results show a strong relationship between the change in the spread and the change in the price of the EUA and for two or three of the four changes in primary CER spread variables. These support our hypothesis that regulatory stringency in issuing CERs has significant price effects in the secondary market and the support is particularly strong at the issuance stage.
[ Table 7 ]
[ Table 8 ]
Conclusions
This paper provides the first empirical analysis of how the regulatory stringency and efficiency of the CDM framework affect CER prices in the secondary market and the price spread between EUAs and CERs. We used survey data on investors' demand for risk premium at four stages of forward contracting in the primary CER market to proxy for the regulatory stringency and efficiency of the CDM framework. Cointergration analysis and GARCH modeling were conducted to analyze the sCER and EUA prices, the EUA-sCER spread and their driving factors.
We show that there is a strong relationship between the change in the residuals for sCER and EUA prices, indicating the common sources of innovation between the two series. This confirms that they share many common price drivers. The proxies for regulatory stringency and efficiency have significant and sizable impact on the CER price in the secondary market and the EUA-sCER price spread. In addition, the carbon market While economic efficiency is an advantage offered by offsets, the regulatory framework and processes have an impact on the cost of supplying carbon credits.
Careful consideration is needed in the design and implementation of the regulatory framework and processes to realize the full potential of economic efficiency offered by offset mechanisms. Given that change in economic conditions can cause paradigm shifts in the emissions market, timely adjustments of the relevant supply and demand factors are important for maintaining market stability. -197.412 -197.407 -197.084 -196.921 -195.604 2 -196.584 -192.491 -192.491 -192.267 -192.267 Akaike Information Criteria by Rank (rows) ΔGER_BASELOAD is the change in the baseload electricity price in Germany, ΔGASPOOL is the change in the price of gas, ΔARA_COAL the change in the price of coal, ΔVIX_CLOSE the change in the market volatility index, and ΔYIELD_SPREAD the change in the yield spread between short and long bonds. 
